Gender Is a Natural Kind with a Historical Essence by Bach, Theodore
Ethics 122 ( January 2012): 231–272
 2012 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2012/12202-0001$10.00
231
ARTICLES
Gender Is a Natural Kind with a
Historical Essence*
Theodore Bach
Traditional debate on the metaphysics of gender has been a contrast of essen-
tialist and social-constructionist positions. The standard reaction to this oppo-
sition is that neither position alone has the theoretical resources required to
satisfy an equitable politics. This has caused a number of theorists to suggest
ways in which gender is unified on the basis of social rather than biological
characteristics but is “real” or “objective” nonetheless—a position I term ‘social
objectivism’. This essay begins by making explicit the motivations for, and cen-
tral assumptions of, social objectivism. I then propose that gender is better
understood as a real kind with a historical essence, analogous to the biologist’s
claim that species are historical entities. I argue that this proposal achieves a
better solution to the problems that motivate social objectivism. Moreover, the
account is consistent with a postpositivist understanding of the classificatory
practices employed within the natural and social sciences.
I. INTRODUCTION: A DILEMMA IN FEMINIST THEORY
Is gender a real kind in nature? Historically, feminists have had reason
to answer both “yes” and “no.” In her influential 1988 essay “Cultural
Feminisim versus Post-structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist
Theory,” Linda Alcoff explains: “The cultural feminist response to
Simone de Beauvoir’s question, ‘Are there women?’ is to answer yes
* Many thanks to Diana Meyers, Dan Ryder, David Slutsky, Ruth Millikan, Tom
Bontly, and Laurie Shrage for helpful discussions and comments on earlier versions
of this article. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees as well as the editors
from Ethics. A previous version of this article was given at the 2009 Eastern meeting
of the American Philosophical Association, where I received many helpful comments
and questions from audience members.
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and to define women by their activities and attributes in the present
culture. The post-structuralist response is to answer no and attack the
category and the concept of woman through problematizing subjec-
tivity.”1
Cultural feminists describe women as a real kind but claim that
the essence of this kind has been obscured and devalued by andro-
centric cultural practices. Poststructuralists, on the other hand, claim
that the very idea of a coherent category “women” is a myth that
functions in the service of patriarchy. Alcoff continues: “Each re-
sponse has serious limitations, and it is becoming increasingly obvious
that transcending these limitations while retaining the theoretical
framework from which they emerge is impossible.”2 Poststructuralists
are limited by their denial of the category woman and therefore the
inability politically to represent women. Cultural feminists are limited
by their exclusion of prima facie women who fail to satisfy enough
properties of the posited feminine essence.
This trade-off between cultural feminism and poststructuralism is
an instance of a general dilemma for feminist theory that has yet to
be satisfactorily resolved: either accept the normative consequences
of articulating real gender kinds or accept the normative conse-
quences of rejecting real gender kinds. The goal of this essay is to
sketch a solution to this dilemma. Like several other researchers in-
vestigating the status of human kinds,3 I draw from principles recently
employed within naturalistic epistemology and ontology. But unlike
current approaches to the naturalization of human kinds I claim that
gender kinds are natural kinds with a historical essence and also that
members of a gender kind possess a common teleological function. I
argue for the ironic conclusion that this appeal to essence and func-
tion achieves a better solution to the theoretical and political prob-
lems that motivate anti-essentialist accounts of gender.
Here is how I will proceed. In the next section, I explain how
realism about gender leads to either the “Representation Problem”
or the “Commonality Problem.” In Section III, I explicate a current
solution to these problems that I term ‘social objectivism’. Section IV
introduces the ontology of historical kinds, and Section V argues that
gender kinds are historical kinds. In Section VI, I argue that a his-
torical essentialist construal of gender provides the best solution to
1. Linda Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism versus Post-structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Fem-
inist Theory,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 13 (1988): 405–36, 407.
2. Ibid., 407.
3. See, e.g., Richard Boyd, “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa,” in Species: New Inter-
disciplinary Essays, ed. R. A. Wilson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 141–85; Ron Mallon,
“Social Construction, Social Roles, and Stability,” in Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social
Reality, ed. Frederick F. Schmitt (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 327–54.
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the Commonality and Representation Problems. Section VII con-
cludes.
II. THE REPRESENTATION AND COMMONALITY PROBLEMS
One way to be a realist about a category K is to claim that members
of K share an intrinsic property P in virtue of which they belong to
K. Property P is then the intrinsic or “Aristotelian” essence of K. One
way to schematize this view is the following:
An individual Q belongs to kind K if and only if Q possesses prop-
erties {Pi . . . Pn} and (a) {Pi . . . Pn} are necessary and sufficient
for being a K, (b) {Pi . . . Pn} are identical to or supervene on
intrinsic properties of Q, (c) {Pi . . . Pn} are immutable (“fixed”),
and (d) the relationship between {Pi . . . Pn} and a set of char-
acteristic/salient properties of K is causal rather than conceptual.
This schema offers conditions for kind essence rather than in-
dividual essence. Members of the kind gold essentially have the atomic
number of 79. Yet certain individuals survive the loss of this property
(a gold-plated chalice), while other individuals presumably do not (a
solid gold ring).4
A maligned tradition of philosophical and scientific theorizing,
commonly termed ‘biological essentialism’ or ‘biologism’, ascribes an
intrinsic essence to gender categories in a way that is analogous to
gold. The causally relevant internal properties on this view are pri-
mary sexual characteristics. For example:
An individual Q belongs to the kind woman if and only if Q pos-
sesses XX chromosomes and female reproductive organs. These
properties (a) are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for
being a woman, (b) supervene on, or are identical with, Q’s oc-
current physiology, (c) consist in the same thing in all times and
places, and (d) are causally rather than conceptually related to
Q’s salient, gendered behavior.
Biological essentialism has historically been placed in the service
of misogynist agenda. It has, for good reasons, been subject to much
philosophical and scientific criticism. The view is most commonly at-
4. For further discussion of the distinction between individual and kind essence, see Samir
Okasha, “Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism,” Synthese 131(2002):
191–213; and Stephen Schwartz, “The Essence of Essence,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87
(2009): 609–23. For a discussion of how various views on gender conflate this distinction, see
Natalie Stoljar, “Essence, Identity, and the Concept of a Woman,” Philosophical Topics 23 (1995):
261–92.
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tacked on the grounds that it is empirically false and that it explains
the social status of women as inevitable, necessary, and therefore jus-
tified.
One response to biological essentialism is to deny that there are
real ontological kinds that correspond to the categories “women” and
“men.” On this view, the only unity that exists for members of a gen-
der category is a conceptual or linguistic unity. Alcoff’s poststructur-
alist feminists, who include Kristeva, Foucault, Derrida, and Martin,
each reject that gender categories refer to mind-independent kinds.
Several political advantages motivate this position: misogynist princi-
ples are not recycled in the act of defining women, critical genealo-
gies reveal sources of oppression, and marginalized groups of women
are not excluded. The result is “free play of a plurality of differences
unhampered by any predetermined gender identity.”5 But most fem-
inists agree that these advantages come at a cost. The idea that there
is a single group of women united in political struggle is made inco-
herent through a nominalist commitment to the mere conceptual or
linguistic status of women. Whose autonomy is denied by androcen-
tric norms? Whose identity is irreducible to primary and secondary
sexual characteristics? Call this the Representation Problem: if there is
no real group “women,” then it is incoherent to make moral claims
and advance political policies on behalf of women.6
In order to avoid both the misogynistic implications of biological
5. Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism versus Post-structuralism,” 418.
6. See also ibid.; Iris Marion Young, “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a
Social Collective,” Signs 19 (1994): 713–38; Stoljar, “Concept of a Woman”; Sally Haslanger,
“Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Nouˆs 34 (2000): 31–
55; Alison Stone, “Essentialism and Anti-essentialism in Feminist Philosophy,” Journal of Moral
Philosophy 1 (2004): 135–53.
Several considerations make the realist/nonrealist division more complicated than can be
explained in these brief remarks. Anticipating the explanatory approach to natural (or real) kinds
put forward in Sec. IV, I assume that nonrealism about gender requires the acceptance of at
least two theses. First, that no current or future explanatory schemes require reference to the
shared properties of gender kind members. Second, that any current or future explanatory
scheme that purports a referential relation to gender is either vacuous, or, to use Kitcher’s
phrase, “objectively wrong-headed” (Phillip Kitcher, “Species,” Philosophy of Science 51 [1984]:
308–33, 330). The gender scheme of Aristotle and Galen, according to which differences in
the body temperatures of males and females causally explain certain developmental and be-
havioral gender differences, is objectively wrong-headed (see Nancy Tuana, The Less Noble Sex:
Scientific, Religious, and Philosophical Conceptions of Woman’s Nature [Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1993], 18–22). Further muddying these waters is the semantic externalist thesis
that our (gender) concepts might refer to natural kinds even if their associated descriptions
are false. For discussions on the interaction between semantic and ontological issues with respect
to social kinds, see Sally Haslanger, “What Good Are Our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and
Social Kinds,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80, suppl. (2006): 89–118; and Ron Mallon,
“‘Race’: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic,” Ethics 116 (2006): 525–51.
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essentialism and the political implications of the Representation Prob-
lem, many feminist scholars have claimed that the category women is
defined by an essential social property: women are real, but their
unity is socially rather than biologically caused. For example, Nancy
Chodorow holds that the difference between men and women is, to
put it simply, a difference between a masculine sense of self (separate
from the world) and a feminine sense of self (connected to the
world).7 This view distinguishes real psychological categories but in-
sists that these categories arise from contingent social divisions of la-
bor rather than from physiological differences. One can interpret
Catharine MacKinnon as advancing a structurally similar theory of
gender. According to MacKinnon, individuals are women in virtue of
their experience of sexual subordination, where subordination is ex-
pressed by contingent social institutions such as pornography.
A considerable amount of feminist scholarship describes how so-
cial definitions of gender such as the above lead to a distinct set of
problems. Two problems—the “commonality” (or “diversity”) and
“normativity” problems—figure prominently in this literature. While
biological essentialist views generate insidious versions of these prob-
lems, the universalism implicit in feminist, social definitions of gender
invoke them as well. I think that there are in fact four versions of
these problems, not always kept distinct, which I will group under the
common heading the Commonality Problems:
1. Inseparability: Gender is not a feature that exists and develops
independently of other (social) features such as race, class,
and religion.
2. Universality: There is simply no feature that all women of all
times and places have in common.
3. Immutability: By defining women according to property P it
follows that (i) the elimination of P entails the elimination
of women, (ii) if an individual possesses P at time 1 and loses
P at time 2, then that individual is no longer a woman.
4. Normativity: Defining women according to an essential prop-
erty privileges those who possess this property, or who possess
more of it, and marginalizes those who do not possess this
property, or who do not possess enough of it.
Critics describe how Chodorow’s definition of gender encounters
each of these problems:8 they point out that gendered personality
does not develop independently of race, class, and religion (the in-
7. See Nancy Chodorow, Reproducing Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1978), 169.
8. See, e.g. Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman (Boston: Beacon, 1988).
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separability problem), that not all women satisfy the description of a
feminine sense of self (the universality problem), that gender groups
would continue to exist even if new modes of socialization were to
emerge (the immutability problem), and that the identification be-
tween feminine sense of self and womanhood marginalizes those
women who do not possess a feminine personality (the normativity
problem).
III. SOCIAL OBJECTIVISM
A current response to both the Representation and Commonality Prob-
lems is a position I term ‘social objectivism’. Social objectivism employs
two dialectical moves designed to address the feminist dilemma. First, it
defines women according to a suitably abstract relational property. This
produces an answer to the Commonality Problems while avoiding the
universalism implicit in extant biological and social definitions of gender.
Second, it employs an ontologically thin notion of “objectivity,” thereby
providing an answer to the Representation Problem. More formally, a
socially objective kind is one for which
(a) the defining property is the result of contingent cultural
practices,
(b) the defining property is a relational rather than intrinsic
property, and
(c) the defining property is “objective” rather than nominal or
essential.
Sally Haslanger has argued for a definition of gender along these
lines, offering the following:9
S is a woman iff (if and only if) S is systematically subordinated
along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and
S is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined
bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role
in reproduction.
S is a man iff S is systematically privileged along some dimension
(economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is “marked” as a target
for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed
to be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction.
These definitions satisfy the first condition of social objectivism be-
cause social norms and institutions could have been other than they
are, in which case males and females need not have been systemati-
cally privileged and subordinated. The definitions satisfy the second
9. Haslanger, “Gender and Race,” 50.
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condition because privilege and subordination are relational prop-
erties that require social relata.
Haslanger states that her account is able to provide a solution to
several of the Commonality Problems. Her view does not assume in-
separability because it “allows that the substantive import of gender
varies from individual to individual within a culture depending on
how the meaning of sex interacts with other socially salient charac-
teristics (e.g., race, class, sexuality, etc.).”10 With respect to universal-
ity, she writes: “To be a Chinese woman of the 1790’s, a Brazilian
woman of the 1890’s, or an American woman of the 1990’s may in-
volve very different social relations, and very different kinds of op-
pression. Yet on the analysis suggested, these groups count as women
insofar as their subordinate positions are marked and justified by ref-
erence to (female) sex.”11
The idea seems to be this: by defining women according to an
abstract relational property, one can capitalize on the fact that rela-
tional category members differ greatly with respect to their intrinsic,
perceptual, and other social features. Consider the relational category
gift. Something is a gift if it plays a specific relational role within a
schema of gift-giving. As long as a token object satisfies this role, there
is no limit on what other properties it might exemplify. A gift, then,
can be realized by just about any object: car, diamond, lamp, frozen
steak, naming a star after someone, and so on. Similarly, individuals
of various races, classes, and interests can realize the social role “sub-
ordinated based on observed or imagined sex.” The only prima facie
women who fall outside Haslanger’s definition are those who are not
subordinated on the basis of perceived or imagined sex. Haslanger is
willing to accept this weakened version of the commonality argument,
partly because she’s not convinced there are such women.12
Haslanger uses a somewhat different strategy to tackle the nor-
mativity and immutability problems. She concedes that her account
may be “implicitly offering a normative ideal of women.”13 She also
concedes a version of immutability by advocating for an egalitarian
gender system and therefore the elimination of men and women. Yet
Haslanger maintains that the theoretical categories “men” and
“women” play a central role in defining normative agenda and that
the definitions she provides, while perhaps excluding and marginal-
izing certain individuals, are important for a positive feminist politics.





This content downloaded from 129.001.011.117 on May 20, 2018 18:52:23 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
238 Ethics January 2012
Commonality Problems may be best served by an account that, to
some small degree, commits minor versions of these problems.14
But in what sense does this nonessentialist concept of gender
track a real structure of reality as opposed to a conventional aspect
of our categorizing? That is, how does social objectivism avoid the
Representation Problem? In a couple of recent papers, Haslanger de-
fends the reality of social kinds through the notion of an objective
type—a concept she borrows from Armstrong.15 While an objective
type does not have an essence, and for this reason is not a “natural
kind” on Haslanger’s terminology, “the notion of objective type
needed is not too mysterious: a set of objects is more an objective
type by virtue of the degree of unity amongst its members beyond a
random or gerrymandered set.”16 Haslanger’s method of determining
if a set of objects has unity is to investigate if, and to what degree,
they are in some sense similar. In order for the type to be objective,
then, the axis of similarity must be objective as opposed to merely
conceptual. As such, objective types represent very weak ontological
unities. Indeed, Haslanger notes that the “items on her desk” consti-
tute an objective type because they share a property and that property
exists objectively rather than nominally. In the case of gender kinds,
the objective similarity is the social role of subordination or privileg-
ing. As I develop the point in Sections V and VI, it is possible, and
politically desirable, to provide a stronger ontological characterization
of the genders men and women according to which they are natural
kinds with explanatory essences.17
While a number of feminist scholars working on the question of
gender may not use Haslanger’s exact terminology, it is clear that they
are relying on the metaphysical picture that Haslanger has made ex-
plicit and which reconciles the Representation and Commonality
Problems. This is the group that I am terming ‘social objectivists’.
Consider Alcoff’s theory that the concept “woman” should be under-
14. Haslanger writes: “The important issue is not whether a particular account ‘margin-
alizes’ some individuals, but whether its doing so is in conflict with the feminist values that
motivate the inquiry. And as far as I can tell, not focusing our theoretical efforts onunderstanding
the position of oppressed females would pose just such a conflict” (ibid.).
15. See David Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview,
1989).
16. Haslanger, “Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds,” 109–10.
17. It is not always clear when Haslanger is involved in what she calls a “descriptive”
project—where one attempts to discover and taxonomize objective types—or an “ameliorative”
(Haslanger, “Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds”) /“analytic” (Haslanger, “Gender and
Race”) project—where the goal is to describe categories that are politically and epistemically
useful. For my purposes it does not matter. In Sec. V, I argue that a historical essentialist account
of gender is preferable for the descriptive project, and in Sec. VI I argue that the historical
account is preferable for the ameliorative/analytic project.
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stood through the notion of positionality. A woman’s position is deter-
mined by a set of cultural practices and expectations that are orga-
nized around the perception of an individual’s possible relationship
to biological reproduction (e.g., giving birth). The reality of gender
derives from the objectivity of this social context, and it follows that
women constitute an objective type. Yet, an individual’s position also
serves as a point of political departure and gendered subjectivity. Be-
cause “the identity of a woman is the product of her own interpre-
tation and reconstruction of her history, as mediated through the
cultural discursive text to which she has access,”18 the type women does
not enforce a common subjective experience or style. Iris Marion
Young’s account that women constitute a social series is also an ex-
ample of social objectivism. A series is a “collective whose members
are unified passively by the relation their actions have to material
objects and practico-inert histories.”19 Women are a series, unified
through their individual relations to the same (objective) set of an-
drocentric institutions, artifacts, and norms. Yet, individual members
of the series can differ greatly in other respects.
The theories of Haslanger, Alcoff, and Young each exemplify the
social objectivist schema: there is an objective similarity that is rela-
tional, based on contingent cultural processes, and which binds mem-
bers into a type (purchasing representation), but the objective simi-
larity does not preclude other objective dis similarities that are
constitutive of the target group (purchasing diversity). Social objec-
tivism is an attractive position because it appears to occupy the only
logical space where the Representation and Commonality Problems
are jointly solved and where the intuition that gender has a core “so-
cial” rather than “natural” dimension is preserved. In the following
section, I show how the possibility of historical essences undermines
this claim.
IV. NATURAL KINDS WITH HISTORICAL ESSENCES
Several feminist authors have emphasized that most analytic philoso-
phers no longer accept a strict identification between essentialism and
Aristotelian, intrinsic essentialism.20 At the same time, theorists work-
ing more directly in the philosophy of science have urged that recent
naturalistic approaches to essentialism have important implications
18. Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism versus Post-structuralism,” 434.
19. Young, “Gender as Seriality,” 727–28.
20. See, e.g., Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking (New York: Routledge, 1989); Susan Babbit,
Impossible Dreams (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Linda Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and
the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Haslanger, “Philosophical Analysis and Social
Kinds.”
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for our understanding of social kinds.21 But the full import of these
insights for a theory of gender has not been realized. In particular,
the notion of a historical essence has not been adequately applied to
the ontology of gender. Modeling men and women as historical kinds,
I now argue, achieves the strongest response to both the Represen-
tation Problem and the Commonality Problem.
A. The Explanatory Approach to Natural Kinds
In order for inductive practices to be successful, there must be stable
correlations of properties that repeat or co-occur throughout nature
or a domain of nature. According to the explanatory approach to natural
kinds, natural kinds are the mind-independent ontological structures
that support successful inductive practice.22 In other words, a natural
kind is a stable set of correlated properties that can be fruitfully stud-
ied. To use a stock example, instances of water reliably exhibit a sim-
ilar boiling point and potential to quench thirst. Scientists can ob-
serve these properties in a few samples of water and, on account of
water’s status as a natural kind, accurately generalize these properties
to unencountered samples. On the other hand, if a theoretical cate-
gory fails to yield reliable predictions and explanations, then this is
evidence that it is not tracking a natural kind. The “superlunary” cat-
egory of Aristotelian physics groups together all of the objects outside
of the moon’s orbit. As Griffiths points out, “nothing follows from the
21. See, e.g., Boyd, “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa”; Ruth Millikan, On Clear and
Confused Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Mallon, “Social Construction,
Social Roles, and Stability”; Crawford Elder, Real Natures and Familiar Objects (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2004).
22. The following philosophers adopt some version of the explanatory approach to natural
kinds: W. V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969); Kitcher, “Species”; Richard Boyd, “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism, and the En-
thusiasm for Natural Kinds,” Philosophical Studies 61 (1991): 127–48; John Dupre´, The Disorder
of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993); Hillary Kornblith, Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1993); Paul E. Griffiths, “Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences,” in
Wilson, Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays (1999), 209–28; Millikan, Clear and Confused; Joseph
Laporte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
For specific formulations, see Boyd’s “accommodation thesis” and Millikan’s theory of “sub-
stances” (Millikan, Clear and Confused, chap. 2).
Two important issues for this theory of kinds are not discussed here. The first concerns how
much of a contribution a theoretical category must make to inductive practices in order to
reference a natural kind. On Griffiths’s view reference to kind members must at least result in
above-chance predictions. A related issue concerns whether the legitimacy of explanatory
schema can be extended outside of the academic sciences (see Dupre´, The Disorder of Things;
Boyd, “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa”; Millikan, Clear and Confused; and Laporte,
Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change). Boyd and Millikan suggest a continuum of epistemic
legitimacy, with some folk inferential practices (e.g., folk psychology) found at the limit of kind-
tracking explanatory schemes.
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fact that an object is superlunary other than the fact that it is super-
lunary and trivial transformations of this (e.g., it is not sublunary).
There is no epistemic pay-off to be had by using this category.”23 The
objects outside of the moon’s orbit are an objective type, but accord-
ing to current scientific theory, they are not a natural kind.
The explanatory approach frees the notion of kind essence from
its traditional and problematic implications. The essence of a natural
kind on this view is the source that organizes, or accounts for, reliable
property correlations.24 It is the select property, or set of properties,
that explains why one instance of the kind is nonaccidentally like
another instance of the kind. In the case of water, the source of prop-
erty correlation is the microstructure H2O: the reason that two sam-
ples of water share a similar boiling point is their intrinsic micros-
tructure.25 However, sources of property correlation are not always
intrinsic features of kind members. Any source of property correlation
that supports induction functions as the essence of a theoretical cat-
egory, or at least plays the theoretical role assigned to “essence” on
Aristotelian and positivist models.26 It is now widely accepted that
kinds often manifest property regularity on the basis of relational
properties. While generalizations that range over such kinds are more
exception-prone, they nevertheless make important explanatory con-
tributions. For example, the economic category money yields impor-
tant generalizations (e.g., about inflation) that, while not exception-
less, are not available on explanatory schemes that restrict classifica-
tions on the basis of intrinsic properties.
Boyd and Mallon employ Boyd’s “homeostatic property cluster”
(HPC) version of the explanatory approach to natural kinds in order
to argue that social roles are natural kinds.27 On the HPC view, natural
kinds are stable clusters of properties, and in many cases there is a
“homeostatic mechanism” that causes and sustains the property clus-
tering. Applying this account to social roles, Boyd and Mallon claim
23. Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 171.
24. See Boyd, “Realism and Anti-Foundationalism”; Kornblith, Inductive Inference; Griffiths,
“Squaring the Circle”; Millikan, Clear and Confused; and Dan Ryder, “SINBAD Neurosemantics:
A Theory of Mental Representation,” Mind and Language 19 (2004): 211–40.
25. On the other hand, “surface-water,” which includes both samples with an H2O mi-
crostructure and samples with an XYZ microstructure, is not a natural kind because likeness
between XYZ-water and H2O-water are accidental. Similar considerations apply to jade, which
includes the minerals jadeite and nephrite. For a discussion, see Crawford Elder, “Higher and
Lower Essential Natures,” American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1993): 255–65.
26. See, esp., Griffiths, “Squaring the Circle.” The helpful phrase “source of correlation”
is from Ryder, “SINBAD Neurosemantics.”
27. Boyd, “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa”; Mallon, “Social Construction, Social
Roles, and Stability.”
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that social role occupants exhibit imperfect similarity and that this
similarity is the result of a relationally described social property. So,
for instance, Mallon argues that a social role consists in a set of la-
beling and conceptual practices and that a social role is a homeostatic
mechanism that causally sustains a cluster of characteristic properties
for its occupants. Applied to gender, the rough idea appears to be
that there is a set of cultural practices and beliefs about women (and
men) that constitutes a “social role” and which (probabilistically)
causes individual women to exhibit characteristic gendered behavior
and traits.28
The HPC approach to social kinds makes progress toward rec-
onciling the Commonality and Representation Problems. It permits
diversity across social role occupants because occupants need only
imperfectly realize a social kind’s characteristic property cluster. The
account also employs a principled view of ontological classification
that generalizes to the natural sciences. Yet, I will claim that the ex-
planatory approach to natural kinds makes available a characteriza-
tion of social kinds that is importantly distinct from the Boyd-Mallon
view and that has an important advantage in its capacity to address
the Commonality Problems. I turn now to this alternative.
B. Historical Essentialism
Two samples of gold share likenesses due to nonhistorical facts about
their microstructure. This is an example of what Ruth Millikan calls
an “eternal kind”—a natural kind for which members’ spatiotemporal
locations play no role in the explanation of their similarities. Reacting
to developments in the study of biological species and categories, Mil-
likan and several other researchers now emphasize the role that his-
torical properties can play in supporting inductive practices.29 Ac-
cording to this view, historical facts about genetic replication and past
selective pressures explain why the members of a species share a phe-
notypic profile. Millikan calls natural kinds whose members are sim-
ilar to one another on account of their historical relations to one
28. Neither Boyd nor Mallon offer a theory of the ontology of gender, yet both appeal
to examples of gender in order to establish their HPC analysis of social kinds. I further discuss
the prospects for a HPC analysis of gender in Sec. VI.A.
29. See Ruth Millikan, “Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences,” Philosophical Studies 95
(1999): 45–65, and Clear and Confused; Griffiths, Emotions, and “Squaring the Circle”; Crawford
Elder, “On the Reality of Medium-Sized Objects,” Philosophical Studies 83 (1996): 191–211, “A
Different Kind of Natural Kind,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995): 516–31, and Real
Natures.
This content downloaded from 129.001.011.117 on May 20, 2018 18:52:23 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Bach Gender Is a Natural Kind with a Historical Essence 243
another historical kinds.30 In contrast to eternal kinds, there is no nat-
ural law by which the essence of a historical kind causes or accounts
for the surface features of the kind. For example, there is no nomo-
logical connection between the essential historical relations that unify
members of the kind Homo sapiens and any particular phenotype. All
that is required to be a member of a historical kind is to possess the
historical essence of that kind.
Let’s get clear on the essence of a historical kind. Millikan sets
out some general conditions for historical kind membership:
Why members of a [historical] kind might be caused to be like one
another are, first, that something akin to reproduction or copying
has been going on, all the various members having been produced
from one another or from the same models and/or, second, that
the various members have been produced by, in, or in response to,
the very same ongoing historical environment, for example, in re-
sponse to the presence of members of other ongoing historical
kinds. A third and ubiquitous causal factor often supporting the first
is that some “function” is served by members of the kind, where
function is understood roughly in the biological sense. . . . It is
typical for these various reasons to be combined.31
The central relation that unites kind members and explains their
likenesses is replication, or reproduction. If B is copied from A, then
A and B are alike because B is copied from A. Direct replication oc-
curs when tokens are directly copied from one another, as happens
when a new genetic segment is copied from an old genetic segment.
Indirect replication, or “reproduction,” occurs when tokens are pro-
duced from a historical model or blueprint whose function is to pro-
duce members of that kind. For example, contemporary Rodin sculp-
tures form a historical kind if they are produced from a token mold
that is designed to reproduce a type of Rodin sculpture. Or biological
devices such as Homo sapiens’ anterior cruciate ligament form a his-
30. For similar views, see Griffiths’s discussion of natural kinds with historical essences
(“Squaring the Circle”), and Elder’s theory of copied kinds (“Medium-Sized Objects,” “Different
Kind of Natural Kind,” Real Natures). While there are important and interesting differences
between these authors, each agree that historical properties are in some sense essential to a
certain kind of real kind. For an attempt to revise Millikan’s view, see David Slutsky, “Confusion
and Dependence in Uses of History,” Synthese, published online October 1, 2010, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9785-4.
31. Millikan, Clear and Confused, 20–21.
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torical kind if they are produced from the “instructions” encoded in
a segment of the human genome.32
When we examine replicative and reproductive processes in
their natural settings, we observe a common interdependence with
the other two conditions mentioned in Millikan’s passage—function
and co-existing historical kinds. Items replicated from lineages that
resulted from selective processes possess a teleological function. Accord-
ing to etiological theories of function, a particular trait T is selected for
replication, over and against historical alternatives, because of a past fa-
vorable effect that T caused for ancestors that possessed T. Once selected,
T has the function of causing this effect.33 For example, human hearts
are reproduced from ancestral hearts because ancestral hearts, more so
than historical alternatives, had the favorable effect of pumping human
blood. “Pumping blood” is thus the teleological function of hearts, and
we can say of a token heart that was reproduced from ancestral hearts
that it is “supposed to” pump blood. Due to a variety of factors, and in
particular infidelity in the genetic copying process, token hearts may fail
to pump blood. Yet they are still hearts because they have the right his-
torical relation to other hearts.
As this familiar story helps indicate, it is in reference to a histor-
ical context that includes co-existing and co-evolved items that we
explain an item’s teleological function. The function of a heart is
relative to the cardiovascular system, a system that is composed of
other biological devices such as capillaries and red blood cells with
distinct teleological functions. This overall system was a candidate for
selection insofar as its parts achieved a certain stability, and the system
was selected for because it, more so than historical alternatives, pro-
duced a fitness-enhancing effect. It is somewhat unfortunate, or at
32. See the discussion of “reproductively established families” in chap. 1 of Ruth Millikan,
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), for an
example of a more technical and detailed account of replication and reproduction. For the
remainder of the essay, I will use the terms ‘replication’ and ‘reproduction’ interchangeably.
When I need to specifically discuss reproduction, I will make the distinction explicit.
33. See, e.g., Ruth Millikan, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1993), chap. 2. Etiological explanations of natural normativity are common in
the philosophy of science, but they are not universally accepted. For discussion, see two edited
volumes: David Buller, ed., Function, Selection, and Design (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1998); and Andrew Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman, eds., Functions: New
Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). See Paul
Sheldon Davies, Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2004), chap. 4, and “The Nature of Natural Norms: Why Selected Functions Are Systemic
Capacity Functions,” Nouˆs 34 (2000): 85–107, for some specific challenges to etiological expla-
nations of natural normativity. Etiological functions are a subtype of teleological functions, but
I will be using the terms ‘etiological’ and ‘teleological’ interchangeably for the remainder of
this article.
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least misleading, that “Cummins functions,” which specify the func-
tion of a part relative to a complex supersystem, have been portrayed
as theoretical rivals to teleological functions. Certainly the classifica-
tions are not co-extensive: some Cummins functions are not teleolog-
ical (parts of a complex system that were not selected for, e.g., span-
drels), and some teleological functions are not Cummins functions
(selected-for traits that are not contributing to a supersystem, e.g., a
diseased heart). But several authors have made clear that most tele-
ological functions were selected for because they performed a Cum-
mins function;34 as a matter of empirical fact, teleological functions
and Cummins functions tend to nonaccidentally coincide. A blood-
pumping, human heart is an example.
My discussion of natural kinds with historical essences, or “his-
torical kinds,” will focus on items that were selected for replication
on account of some contribution they made to the stability and overall
effect of a more general, selected-for system. In other words, I will
focus on historical kinds for which the teleological function is also a
Cummins function. This strategy has the additional benefit of unify-
ing and codifying Millikan’s three conditions for historical kind mem-
bership. Here is a summary of some important facts about these his-
torical kinds:
1. The essential property of a historical kind, possession of
which confers kind membership to an individual, is partici-
pation in a lineage.
2. This property defines kind essence rather than individual es-
sence.
3. In order to exemplify this relational property an individual
must be a replication or reproduction of ancestors from this
lineage.
4. Replication and reproduction are ontogenetic processes. Re-
production is an ontogenetic process caused by mechanisms
that, on account of their history, have the function of pro-
ducing historical kind members.
5. While historical kind members tend to be like one another
in various ways and on account of their history, nonhistorical
similarities are not necessary for kind membership.
6. An individual that is reproduced from a historical lineage
that resulted from selective processes possesses a teleological
function.
34. See, e.g., Kitcher, “Species”; Paul E. Griffiths, “Functions Analysis and Proper Func-
tions,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 409–22; David Buller, “Etiological
Theories of Functions: A Geographical Survey,” Biology and Philosophy 4 (1998): 505–27.
This content downloaded from 129.001.011.117 on May 20, 2018 18:52:23 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
246 Ethics January 2012
7. The teleological function of a historical kind member is de-
fined by the contribution made by ancestral kind members
to the stability and effect of a more general historical system.
Because replication and selection are general processes, histori-
cal kinds obtain outside of biology. As I describe in the next section,
cultural forms of replication, reproduction, and selection carve out
induction-supporting historical kinds with normative properties (tel-
eological functions) in a way that is analogous to genetic replication,
reproduction, and natural selection.
V. GENDER KINDS ARE HISTORICAL KINDS
If genders are historical kinds, then being a woman or a man is not
a matter of possessing some set of biological or psychological prop-
erties, as these are merely probabilistic indicators of a deeper histor-
ical unity. Nor, for the same reason, is it to occupy a certain social
position (Haslanger). Being a woman or a man, I now argue, is to
have the right sort of origin and replicative history in relation to a
more fundamental historical kind—a replicating gender system.
A. The Historical Gender System
By way of analogy, consider first what it is to be a member of the
historical kind “1990 Nissan Sentra” (hereafter “Sentra”). Sentras are
replicated systems. The reason that two token Sentras tend to have
good gas mileage, front-wheel drive, and a faulty driver’s door hinge
is because they have been reproduced from the same historical design
plan. Sentras consist of various subparts, such as the fuel exhaust,
transmission, and radiator, all of which have separate but interdepen-
dent lineages. The reason that Sentras were reproduced was, first,
because these subcomponents achieved a stable interdependency, and
second, the overall effect of this system satisfied the interests of con-
sumers and carmakers more so than competitor systems.
Now consider one of these subparts, the kind “Sentra transmis-
sion.” Sentra transmissions are historical kinds because individual to-
kens are reproductions of a lineage (or “line,” to adopt the industry
lingo) of Sentra transmissions. On account of their history of repro-
duction under past selection pressures, Sentra transmissions also pos-
sess a teleological function. To identify this function we ask, “how did
ancestral transmissions contribute to the stability and selected-for ef-
fect of the Sentra system?” The answer is the system-relative role (or
Cummins function) shifting gears in Sentras. An individual hunk of
steel is a Sentra transmission if it has been designed to shift gears in
Sentras. Hunks of steel are so designed if they have been copied di-
rectly from other Sentra transmissions or built from a historical blue-
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print for Nissan transmissions. On the other hand, a molecular du-
plicate of a Sentra transmission created in a junkyard lightning storm
is not a member of the kind Sentra transmission because it does not
have the right history. There is also no sense in which it could mal-
function.35
My claim is that a gender system should be analyzed in much the
same way as the historical kind “1990 Nissan Sentra” and that the
components of a gender system should be analyzed in much the same
way as the historical components of a Sentra. It is possible to discern
several processes that, through their causal interdependence, have led
to the selection, maintenance, and ongoing reproduction of gender
systems. The system is homeostatic, which is to say that its various
components have achieved a stability that is resistant, though not im-
pervious, to change. It does not follow that the system is necessary,
and it certainly does not follow that the system is desirable or ethical
(see Secs. V.C and VI.B.3). I propose that the components of a bi-
nary36 gender system include:
1. Binary sexual categories: The sexual categories male and female
as defined by chromosomes, reproductive organs, and sec-
ondary sexual characteristics. On the other hand, intersexual
categories, while biologically real, are not a part of extant
gender systems.
2. Conceptual gender dualism: The tendency for individuals to
think and categorize in terms of the masculine and femi-
nine binary, including but not limited to (a) gender stereo-
types: the association between females and feminine traits
and males and masculine traits; (b) correspondence bias: the
interpretation of others’ behavior as being caused by inner
dispositions rather than situational constraints,37 for exam-
ple, the assumption that gendered behavior is the product
of psychology and physiology rather than social expectan-
cies; and (c) injunctive gender norms: the normative idealiza-
tion between sex and gender, the moral disapproval of in-
dividuals’ deviation from gender norms, and the moral
35. Fred Dretske, “Absent Qualia,” Mind and Language 11 (1996): 78–85; Millikan, Lan-
guage, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.
36. There is no a priori reason to insist that all gender systems must be binary or that a
token binary system must remain binary (see Sec. VI.B.3 for a discussion of the mutability of
gender systems). However, it is likely that the dimension of a gender system is consistent across
components (i.e., it is a ternary system throughout, or a quaternary system throughout, and
so on). My focus in this article will be on binary gender systems.
37. See Alice Eagly, Wendy Wood, and Amanda Diekman, “Social Role Theory of Sex
Differences and Similarities: A Current Appraisal,” in Developmental Social Psychology of Gender,
ed. Thomas Eckes and Hanns M. Trautner (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2000), 123–74, 137.
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approval of individuals’ conformity to gender norms.
3. Gender identity (or gender self-concept): The process whereby one
identifies with a particular gender role, conceptualizes one-
self as gendered, and interprets injunctive gender norms as
applicable to oneself.
4. Binary gender socialization practices : Including but not limited
to sex segregation, caregiver dispositions toward male and
female children, and patterns of sexual objectification.38
5. Social and legal institutions : Including but not limited to gen-
der differences in the law, civil rights, and pornography.
6. Binary gendered artifacts : Including but not limited to mas-
culine and feminine toys, clothing styles, rituals, and role
models.
7. Binary gender roles for individuals : The roles ‘man’ and ‘woman’,
including position in a social hierarchy, division of labor, agentic
versus communal personal characteristics, and differences in
bodily presentation.39
Components 1–7 are causally interdependent: their individual histo-
ries of reproduction are enforced and facilitated by one another,
much like the elements of an ecosystem or the components of a car.
Here is a simplified demonstration. Individuals are more likely
to correlate aggressive behavior, agentic psychology, and entre-
preneurship with perceived or imagined males and passive behav-
ior, communal psychology, and domestic skill with perceived or
38. On sexual objectification, see Barbara Fredrikson and Tomi-Ann Roberts, “Objectifi-
cation Theory: Toward Understanding Women’s Lived Experiences and Mental Health Risks,”
Psychology of Women Quarterly 21 (1997): 173–206.
39. In philosophy and the social sciences, the expression ‘social role’ is ambiguous
between at least three meanings: (1) the characteristic traits and behavior of social role
occupants, (2) the cultural representations and expectations for characteristic traits and
behaviors of social role occupants, and (3) the social identity of social role occupants. Re-
searchers in sociology tend to use the expression to refer to meaning 1, and researchers in
psychology tend to use the expression to refer to meaning 2 (Eagly, Wood, and Diekman,
“Social Role Theory,” 130–31 n. 1). As will become clear below, my use of the expression
‘gender role’ refers to the first of these meanings: characteristic traits and behavior. The
conceptual gender dualism component of the gender system refers to meaning 2, and the gender
identity component refers to meaning 3. In contrast, Mallon’s HPC account of social kinds
uses the expression “social role kind” to refer to meaning 2. According to Mallon, social
role kinds qua conceptual/labeling practices act as homeostatic mechanisms which causally
structure the characteristic properties and behaviors of social role occupants. While there is
much that Mallon and I agree on, the views are quite different in this respect. The naturalized
social kinds that emerge on Mallon’s view are cultural/conceptual entities, e.g., masculine
social role. On my view, the naturalized social kinds are actual historical lineages of men and
women, these lineages selected for by cultural reproductive processes. More generally, the
views are different in their use of history. See the discussion in Sec. VI.A.
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imagined females.40 Differential socialization, often implemented
through gender-coded artifacts and role models, exerts normative
pressure on sexed individuals to conform behaviorally to these
gender stereotypes. This normative pressure consists in social rewards
for sex-appropriate behavior and social disapproval for sex-inappropri-
ate behavior. As a result, individuals often conform to gender expec-
tations.41 Gender expectations also cause individuals to internalize
norms and thereby self-identify with their assigned gender. Children
who are socialized within a gender system contribute to this normali-
zation at a very early age, often by enforcing gender expectancies within
sex-segregated peer groups.42 In general, when individuals act in ways
that are appropriate to their gender role, perceivers use a “correspon-
dence bias” to infer inner (e.g., sexual, psychological) causes of behav-
ior rather than contextual or social causes.43 Various legal and social
institutions, such as pornography, function to justify the correspon-
dence bias by portraying the sexes as naturally occupying positions in
the gender hierarchy.44 And so on.
B. Teleological Gender Function
Reproduced members of a historical gender kind possess a teleolog-
ical gender function if the gender lineage of which they are a repro-
duction resulted from selective processes. One method for ascribing
teleological gender properties is to appeal to the evolutionary and
reproductive pressures faced by ancestral males and females. Several
evolutionary psychologists contend that aspects of current gender
roles are phenotypic expressions of sex-specific genotypes selected for
under ancestral evolutionary pressures. Social learning theorists dis-
agree, arguing that cultural rather than genetic factors explain gen-
40. Alice Eagly and Antonio Mladinic, “Gender Stereotypes and Attitudes toward Women
and Men,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 15 (1989): 543–58; Robert Baron, Gideon
Markman, and Azita Hirsa, “Perceptions of Women and Men as Entrepreneurs: Evidence for
Differential Effects of Attributional Augmenting,” Journal of Applied Psychology 86 (2001): 923–
29.
41. M. L. Snyder, “On the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Social Stereotypes,” in Cognitive
Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior, ed. D. L. Hamilton (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981),
183–212; James M. Olson, Neal J. Roese, and Mark P. Zanna, “Expectancies,” in Social Psychology:
Handbook of Basic Principles, ed. E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (New York: Guilford, 1996),
211–38.
42. Eleanor E. Maccoby, “Gender as a Social Category,” Developmental Psychology 24 (1988):
755–65; Beverly Fagot, Carie Rodgers, and Mary Leinbach, “Theories of Gender Socialization,”
in The Developmental Social Psychology of Gender, ed. Thomas Eckes and Hanns Trautner (Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum, 2004), 65–89.
43. Eagly, Wood, and Diekman, “Social Role Theory.”
44. For example, Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1987).
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der differences and the structure of extant gender systems. I will not
review this debate here but will note that the historical analysis to be
offered is logically consistent with both positions. If there are impor-
tant genetic determinants of current gender differences, then biolog-
ical properties constrain the possible structures of historical gender
systems.45 However, I claim it a virtue of the historical account that it
is compatible with, and provides an ontological framework for, the
social learning explanation. (An analogous virtue is claimed by phi-
losophers of mind who defend the thesis that mental states are mul-
tiply realizable functional states. While the thesis of multiple realiza-
bility does not rule out the possibility that immaterial souls realize
mental states, the central motivation for this view is the empirical
possibility that a wide variety of physical states realize mental states.)
In order to develop this framework, then, I will assume that the struc-
ture of extant gender systems and the content of current gender roles
are culturally rather than biological determined. Relatedly, I will as-
sume that it is possible for social communities to realize alternative
homeostatic gender systems—systems that rational agents would agree
are more suitable for the fundamental interests of all autonomous
individuals.
How, then, might cultural processes reproduce historical gender
kinds such that they possess teleological functions? Put slightly differ-
ently, what cultural mechanisms favor, and account for the biased
transmission of, gender variants? With respect to current gender sys-
tems, the institutions already in place (media, schools, medical pro-
fession, etc.) play a central role in favoring the transmission of par-
ticular gender variants. I sketch this institutional role for the selection
of the binary structure of sexual categories below, and in Section V.C,
I describe how institutions favor particular content variants for the
gender roles men and women. Still, we require an account of how the
institutions that originally structure a gender system could result from
cultural mechanisms of selective retention rather than from accident
or biological determination.
There is now evidence and reasonable speculation about the or-
45. Analogously, it is the physical difference between a collection of steel and a collection
of cotton that explains why the former but not the latter can play the historical role of shifting
gears in Nissan Sentras. See Simon Baron-Cohen, The Essential Difference: Male and Female Brains
and the Truth about Autism (New York: Basic Books, 2004), for an example of a view on which
biological differences between the sexes would constrain certain aspects of gender role (e.g.,
personal and interpersonal characteristics). See Rebecca Jordan-Young, Brain-Storm: The Flaws
in the Science of Sex Differences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); and Cordelia
Fine, Delusions of Gender: How Our Minds, Society, and Neurosexism Create Difference (New York:
Norton, 2010), for recent challenges to empirical claims that link sex-specific biological differ-
ences to gender differences.
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igins of patriarchy. According to many social scientists and historians,
physical differences between the sexes (e.g., upper body strength, re-
productive capacity), in conjunction with technological, social, and
ecological contextual factors (e.g., the transition from shifting culti-
vation to plough cultivation), caused a division of labor with males
more likely farming and females more likely performing family
work.46 However, it is the institutions that were created during the
cultural interpretation and assimilation of this division of labor that
arguably best explain the creation of gender hierarchy. It is likely that
groups developed belief systems that described women as essentially
(rather than contextually) reproducers and caregivers and men as
essentially public and resource providers.47 Through socialization,
families culturally reproduced these beliefs because they better se-
cured resources for production-dependent females.48 Eventually, these
belief systems were codified in law.49 It is also likely that increasingly
complex socioeconomic conditions, such as those brought on by sed-
entary agriculture, led to the sexual control of women.50 In part be-
cause females represented a biological source of new laborers, groups
developed cultural institutions such as incest taboo, patrilineal inher-
itance, and the forceful exchange of women that regulated human
reproduction and kinship relations. These institutions played a cen-
tral role in establishing women’s social role as reproducer and men’s
social role as controller of resources.51
46. Ester Boserup, Woman’s Role in Economic Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970);
Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Marvin
Harris, “The Evolution of Human Gender Hierarchies: A Trial Formulation,” in Sex and Gender
Hierarchies, ed. Barbara D. Miller (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 57–80; Wendy
Wood and Alice Eagly, “A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Behavior of Women and Men: Impli-
cations for the Origins of Sex Differences,” Psychological Bulletin 128 (2002): 699–727.
47. Wood and Eagly, “Origins of Sex Differences”; Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano, and
Nathan Nunn, “On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough,” NBER Working
Paper no. 17098 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2011).
48. See Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth, Women, Work, and Politics: The Political
Economy of Gender Equality (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). The authors argue
that men’s greater bargaining power—a power that resulted from their mobile farming skills
—“translates into norms as parents socialize their children to make the best use of opportunities
available to them. . . . Where economic efficiency gives males a bargaining advantage on account
of greater mobility of their human capital from a gendered division of labor, families do best
by socializing a daughter to cultivate the femininity that will help her win a good man and the
docility that will help her keep him” (33).
49. See Lerner, Patriarchy.
50. See Claude Le´vi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship (Boston: Beacon, 1969);
Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex,” in Toward an
Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna Reiter (New York: Monthly Review, 1975), 157–210; Lerner,
Patriarchy; Wood and Eagly, “Origins of Sex Differences.”
51. Lerner, Patriarchy.
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Once in place, these and other cultural institutions reproduce
the interdependences of a gender system regardless of the presence
of the initial contextual factors. For instance, societies that leave an
agricultural economy persist in the maintenance of the gender roles
and norms that originated in agricultural socioeconomic conditions.
Remarkably, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn found that present-day fe-
male descendents of historical societies that employed plough tech-
nology have lower rates of entrepreneurship, participation in politics,
and participation in the labor force.52 These authors also found that
descendents of historical plough societies are more likely to have at-
titudes that favor gender hierarchy. These considerations identify his-
torical soil conditions (conditions that differentially benefited plough
use) and cultural modes of reproduction, rather than evolutionary
conditions and biological modes of reproduction, as explanatory of
the emergence and maintenance of historical gender systems.
We can determine the teleological function of a gender kind by
its past favorable effect toward the stabilization of the gender system,
this favorable effect accounting for the reproduction of members of
that kind. For example, the binary structure of sexual categories was
culturally favored over other structures (ternary, quaternary, etc.) be-
cause it better comported with other gender dualisms, thereby stabi-
lizing the gender system. On the other hand, a structure of five sexual
categories that is inclusive of (biologically real) intersexual categories
does not contribute to, and in fact destabilizes, the structure of in-
terdependencies within a gender system. For this reason, intersexual
categories have been culturally selected against. Various institutions,
including the family and medical professions, carry out this selective
process by marginalizing intersexuals and in many cases surgically
reassigning intersexuals as either male or female. This makes clear
one sense in which sex is “socially constructed.” The sexual categories
male and female are to play specific roles within a historical, repli-
cating system. Calling a baby “female” is prescriptive because it indi-
cates, in reference to historically defined norms, how this individual
is supposed to interact with other components of a socially replicated
system. There is no such historical role for intersexuals.
C. The Historical Roles of Men and Women
The current proposal does not aim to establish the essential proper-
ties or the teleological gender functions for men and women through
conceptual analysis. It is rather through empirical investigation of a
gender system and its replicative history that we can discover the on-
52. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, “Women and the Plough.”
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tological status of its subparts.53 The difference between empirical and
conceptual analyses of gender kinds is perhaps most clear when we
examine cases in which the surface properties of an item cross classify
the kind status of an item. For a type of toy or a type of clothing to
be gendered is not for it to have a certain “masculine” or “feminine”
appearance—for it to look and operate like a truck versus a doll or
a necktie versus a skirt. A type of toy is a boy’s toy and a type of
clothing is women’s clothing on the basis of the type’s historical role
in the gender system. Many of the superficial features of an item that
are typically associated with gender status (“rough,” “pink”) do not
define the category, then, but are property syndromes that occur
probabilistically on the basis of the kind’s historical source of property
correlation.
For example, items that exemplify the nonhistorical properties
that conventionally define skirts—draped, cone-shaped, and leg-cover-
ing—are members of a masculine kind if they belong to a historical
lineage of a masculine artifact kind. That is, if a draped, cone-shaped,
and leg-covering garment is a reproduction of a lineage of garments
whose historical role in a gender system is the symbolization of mas-
culine gender, then the item is a member of a historical, masculine
artifact kind. Thus Scottish kilts form a masculine artifact kind on
account of the historical contribution that ancestral kilts made to a
gender system. An individual piece of clothing is a kilt if it has been
copied from or designed from other kilts. Now, suppose such a kilt
were never worn and instead spent its career hanging from a window
and blocking sun. The item is still a member of the historical and
masculine kind kilt, although it never performs its teleological func-
tion of symbolizing masculinity. On the other hand, if a Scotsman is
in a pinch and borrows a garment that was designed as a women’s
skirt, though the item has the current Cummins function of symbol-
53. The description of the interacting components of the gender system is drawn
from empirical work in the fields of developmental psychology, sociology, and social
psychology, as well as the interdisciplinary theoretical framework of role theory. For a
review of role theory in the sociological tradition, see B. J. Biddle, “Recent Developments
in Role Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 67–92. For a review of role theory
in the developmental psychology and social psychology traditions, see Eagly, Wood, and
Diekman, “Social Role Theory.” This empirical commitment also reserves an essential
role for feminist scholarship in the epistemology of gender categories. Feminist con-
tributions include the development of new theory, critical investigations that reveal
gender-related presuppositions in both folk and empirical theory, and critical evaluation
of the import of empirical observations (see Lynn Hankinson Nelson, “Epistemological
Communities,” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter [New
York: Routledge, 1993], 121–59; Helen Longino, “Subjects, Power, and Knowledge: De-
scription and Prescription in Feminist Philosophy of Science,” in Alcoff and Potter,
Feminist Epistemologies [1993], 101–20).
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izing masculinity and covering a male’s legs, it is not a member of
the historical kind kilt.54
In order to determine the teleological function of the gender
roles men and women, we must investigate the contributions made by
the historical lineages of men and women toward the stabilization of
a gender system. Plausible candidates for these contributions include,
but are not limited to, the following features:
1. Social hierarchy : Women have less status and power than men.55
“Status” and “power” refer to social resources, possession of
which enable individuals and groups to better assert their will
relative to individuals and groups that do not have status and
power. Examples of power include determining public policy,
controlling financial institutions, and having better access to
high-status and high-paying positions.
2. Division of labor : Women are more likely to perform house-
hold labor, and men are more likely to perform paid labor.
Although this division is not as sharp as it once was, recent
reviews indicate that women perform twice as much house-
hold labor as men.56 There is also gender segregation within
the paid labor market, with more women than men having
54. Kilts possess a type of teleological function that Millikan terms a ‘coordinating
function’ (see, esp., Ruth Millikan, Language: A Biological Model [New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005]). In Scotland, draped cone-shaped garments coordinate refer-
ence to men, and elsewhere such garments coordinate reference to women. As is true
of arbitrary signifiers in natural language, history of use rather than form determines
an item’s coordination function: it is because the item solved a coordination problem,
and not because it has any particular intrinsic features, that it was reproduced and
formed a historical lineage with the function of solving that particular coordination
problem. How forms get initially slotted to play a coordinating role is often arbitrary,
but once reproduced on the basis of its ability to solve the coordination problem, the
form acquires the relevant coordinating function. Certain gendered artifacts and cloth-
ing styles have forms that are arbitrarily related to their coordinating function. However,
most historical gender kinds were selected for because of some feature or features that
are specific to these items and which explain their ability to contribute to the stabili-
zation of the gender system. For example, it is not the case that pornography is arbitrarily
related to the objectification of women, or that rough play is arbitrarily related to the
socialization of males, or that injunctive gender norms are arbitrarily related to gender
identity and elective cosmetic surgery, and so on. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer
from this journal for helping me recognize the importance of this point.
55. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2008,” Report 1017
(July 2009), US Department of Labor, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, DC, 1–91;
Eschel M. Rhoodie, Discrimination against Women: A Global Survey of the Economic, Educational,
Social and Political Status of Women (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1989).
56. Scott Coltrane, “Research on Household Labor: Modeling and Measuring the
Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work,” Journal of Marriage and Family 62
(2000): 1208–33.
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jobs that require skills associated with household labor,57 and
gender segregation within household labor, with women
more likely to perform “core housework” (cooking meals,
housecleaning, laundry) and men more likely to perform re-
pairs, outdoor chores, and financial tasks.58
3. Personal and interpersonal characteristics : Men on average have
more agentic (or instrumental) traits, and women on aver-
age have more communal (or expressive traits). In partic-
ular, men are more likely to seek independence and mas-
tery, while women are more likely to seek solidarity and
interpersonal connection. Men are more likely to be asser-
tive and aggressive, while women are more likely to be
tender-minded.59
4. Body management : Women and men pursue different modes
of bodily self-presentation. This includes, but is not limited
to, different “technologies of body management” (as Bordo
terms it), such as makeup, elective cosmetic surgery, and
steroids, a focus on youthful versus sophisticated appear-
ance, an emphasis on weight management versus muscle
management, and the higher rate at which women smile
relative to men.60
We can assume that ancestral males and ancestral females exhib-
ited a range of social and behavioral traits. Among these competing
gender role cultural variants, sexed individuals who exemplified prop-
erties 1–4 in conformity to the dualisms that structure a gender system
acted to stabilize that system more than individuals who did not ex-
emplify these properties. If these gender roles were culturally repro-
duced on account of this stabilizing effect, we can conclude that they
were culturally selected for. On the etiological account of functions
sketched earlier, the binary sets of properties described in properties
1–4 constitute the teleological functions of men and women.
57. Mariko L. Chang, “The Evolution of Sex Segregation Regimes,” American
Journal of Sociology 105 (2000): 1658–1701.
58. Suzanne M. Bianchi, Melissa A. Milkie, Liana C. Sayer, and John P. Robinson,
“Is Anyone Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household
Labor,” Social Forces 79 (2000): 191–228.
59. For empirical reviews, see Alice Eagly and Wendy Wood, “Explaining Sex
Differences in Social Behavior: A Meta-analytic Perspective,” Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 17 (1991): 306–15; and Alan Feingold, “Gender Differences in
Personality: A Meta-analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 116 (1994): 429–56.
60. Judith A. Hall, “How Big Are the Nonverbal Sex Differences? The Case of
Smiling and Sensitivity to Nonverbal Cues,” in Sex Differences and Similarities in Com-
munication: Critical Essays and Empirical Investigations of Sex and Gender in Interaction,
ed. D. J. Canary and K. Dindia (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1998), 59–81.
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Various cultural mechanisms favored these gender roles and ex-
plain their frequency in a population. MacKinnon, Lerner, Acker, and
others have made clear that many institutions are inherently struc-
tured so as to exclude women in the allocation of status and power;
gendered individuals—specifically women—often exemplify gender
role properties under coercive conditions.61 Coercion can also be
more subtle. Women are looked at more often than men.62 The ob-
jectifying effect of the male gaze often leads to self-objectification,
which in turn causes women to adopt a stricter regimen of bodily
presentation.63 More generally, institutions socially reward sexed in-
dividuals who conform to gender role properties and punish individ-
uals who fail to conform. With respect to body management, Fred-
rickson and Roberts report that obesity more negatively affects wom-
en’s social mobility than men’s, that “women deemed unattractive by
their coworkers are described more negatively than comparably un-
attractive men,” and that women experience job discrimination on
the basis of “unfeminine appearance.”64 In general, there is no short-
age of empirical evidence describing how sexed individuals are mar-
ginalized and privileged on the basis of whether they exemplify gen-
der role properties.
The process through which institutions favor gender role variants
can also be expressed within Richerson and Boyd’s theoretical frame-
work for cultural selection.65 According to Richerson and Boyd, pres-
tige bias and conformist bias are important forces explaining the pref-
erential adoption of cultural variants. Prestige bias refers to the
tendency of individuals to imitate and copy those in prestigious po-
sitions. Conformist bias refers to the tendency for individuals to copy
behaviors that are common. Richerson and Boyd claim that a cultural
variant is selected for if the effects of holding that variant cause the
holder to be imitated, in which case the variant is more likely to be
transmitted to others. Given prestige and conformist bias, this means
that a cultural variant is more likely to be selected if it causes its
bearer to become more common and/or more prestigious. It follows
that the cultural forces determining what counts as prestigious and
61. Catharine MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An
Agenda for Theory,” Signs 7 (1982): 515–44; Lerner, Patriarchy; Joan Acker, “Hier-
archies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations,” Gender and Society 4
(1990): 139–58.
62. Judith A. Hall, Nonverbal Sex Differences: Communication Accuracy and Expressive
Style (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
63. Fredrikson and Roberts, “Objectification Theory.”
64. Ibid., 178.
65. See Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture
Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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what types are common function as important mechanisms of cultural
selection.
Applying this framework, several components of the gender
system—particularly gender socialization and gender institutions—
function as important mechanisms for the cultural selection of gender
role variants. It is well known that the media grants prestigious status
to men and women who exemplify traditional gender role proper-
ties.66 Given prestige bias, we can then expect that individuals who
adopt these gender roles are more likely to be copied and imitated.
In a society where individuals are segregated on the basis of sex and
injunctive gender norms apply, we can expect that within segregated
groups sex-appropriate gender role variants will be more common
than sex-inappropriate variants. Given conformist bias, we can then
expect that individuals who adopt these standard gender roles will be
copied and imitated. Note also that the exclusion of women from
positions of power and status precludes these women from serving as
models of power and status. Moreover, because parents serve as mod-
els to children, institutions that mark nonconformist men and women
as less respectable and less worthy of marriage and/or parenting (As-
syrian veiling, female genital mutilation, and hate speech directed at
powerful women, to name a few) also count as mechanisms for the
selection of gender-role variants.
Two caveats about teleological gender function deserve emphasis
here. First, ancestral men and women need not have exemplified all,
most, or even any of the behavioral, psychological, and positional
properties that constitute their gender role. It is only necessary that
enough sexed individuals exemplified at least some of these proper-
ties enough of the time. The exact thresholds of these variables that
is required for the selection of a role depends on the selective pres-
sures that exist for the wider historical system and also the role’s con-
tribution to that system. For example, in the case of human sperm,
for which the selected historical role is the fertilization of female ova,
it was only necessary that a very tiny fraction of sperm performed this
role.
Second, the type of normativity that attaches to an item in virtue
of its teleological function is not equivalent to, and often in opposi-
tion to, evaluative and prescriptive norms.67 The teleological function
of a virus is to spread and infect, and the teleological function of a
66. See, e.g., Sandra-Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenom-
enology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990); and Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight:
Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
67. Ruth Millikan, “Biofunctions: Two Paradigms,” in Ariew, Cummins, and Perl-
man, Functions (2002), 113–42, 116.
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cruise missile is to deliver a warhead. But we would not say that a
virulent virus satisfies the evaluative and prescriptive norms of human
health, and it is debatable whether cruise missiles satisfy evaluative
and prescriptive norms. Similarly, the statement that women, on ac-
count of their teleological function, are “supposed to” perform a his-
torical gender role is neither evaluative nor prescriptive. The seman-
tic sense of normativity that follows from the historical analysis of
gender is elliptical for a description of the causal relationship between
an individual, with a certain ontogenetic history, and a system of social
interdependencies, with a certain phylogenetic history. This is an em-
pirical norm, discoverable through investigating historical relations,
although it is likely explanatory of many of the felt pressures of ev-
eryday gendered life.
These different senses of normativity have important implications
for the political negotiation of gender. Consider someone who judges
that women ought (in the evaluative/prescriptive sense) to have less
power, resources, and opportunities than men. Such a person posi-
tively values and prescribes current teleological gender norms. How-
ever, if the argument given for this position is “men and women ought
(in the prescriptive/evaluative sense) to perform traditional gender
roles because men and women ought (in the historical/teleological
sense) to perform traditional gender roles,” then this argument either
begs the question or is invalid because it equivocates on the term
‘ought’. Arguing for evaluative gender norms requires careful consid-
eration of ethical parameters such as rational autonomy, human flour-
ishing, social justice, and equal rights. These considerations inform
much feminist theory in which evaluative and prescriptive norms of-
ten describe social relationships that require gendered individuals to
act in ways that would result in their failing to satisfy the teleological
norms of their gender roles. To illustrate, many feminists evaluate
elective cosmetic surgery68 and obsessive dieting69 as harmful to
women, while noting that these practices are replicated and norma-
tive within the current gender system.
While evaluative gender norms are not deducible from historical
gender norms, the historical and teleological status of gender is still
important for evaluative and political discussions about gender. For
one, it is politically useful to have adequate descriptive theories of the
targeted social groups. While evaluative deliberations determine our
political goals, we cannot chart a political course to these goals (and
thus we cannot determine what obstacles lie between us and these
68. See, e.g., Kathryn P. Morgan, “Woman and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and
the Colonization of Women’s Bodies,” Hypatia 6 (1991): 25–53.
69. See, e.g., Bordo, Unbearable Weight.
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goals) without an adequate account of our current social and political
location. The proposed ontology interprets the destination point of
gender egalitarianism as a future gender system that culturally repro-
duces men and women so that they are supposed to have (in the
historical/etiological sense) equal status, power, and labor opportu-
nities. The proposed ontology helps locate the departure point by
describing the natures and boundaries of the targeted social groups.70
Furthermore, the proposed historical ontology construes the so-
cial and political equality of men and women as a theoretical possibility.
On the other hand, gender ontologies that are essentially hierarchical
(such as Haslanger’s) theorize egalitarianism as incompatible with the
preservation of the genders men and women (see Sec. VI.B.3). This
theoretical point has practical implications. I agree with Haslanger
that our gender categories ought to help us meet our political goals,
but if our political goal is gender equality, it may be more politically
useful to have gender categories for which the attainment of this goal
requires us to change, rather than eliminate, the groups men and
women. That is, it may be difficult to motivate gender elimination to
the degree to which people identify with their gender. In Section VI,
I further explore the implications of the proposed historical ontology
for the political status of men and women.
D. The Ontogenetic Processes through Which Individuals Become Members
of a Historical Gender Kind
One is not born a man or a woman any more than a hunk of steel is
born a Sentra Transmission. A hunk of steel comes to belong to the
historical kind Sentra Transmission if it is a reproduction of a lineage
of Sentra Transmissions—if it is sculpted and pounded according to
a historically specified Nissan design plan. Similarly, a collection of
organic material comes to be a member of the historical kind human
heart if it is constructed according to a genetic design that has the
function of producing hearts. In this section, I describe the ontoge-
netic processes through which sexed individuals are made reproduc-
tions of the lineages of men and women and thereby become mem-
bers of the historical kinds men and women.
There are many levels at which reproduction occurs in a gender
system and many mechanisms that carry out reproductions. Our con-
cern here is the mechanisms that assign individuals to historically de-
fined gender roles, thereby producing reproductions of men and
women. The most important and familiar process is differential so-
cialization. New parents describe their infants according to sex ste-
70. In this respect, what Haslanger terms the ameliorative/analytic project (see n.
17) cannot be considered in abstraction from the descriptive project.
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reotypes even when infants do not vary in length, weight, or Apgar
scores.71 Parents talk differently to their child on the basis of sex, with
boys receiving more directives, prohibitions, and disparaging names
(e.g., “wiseguy,” “nutcake”) and girls receiving more questions, sup-
portive speech, and twice as much emotion talk.72 Sex segregation,
which occurs uniformly in both school and peer groups, significantly
amplifies the effects of differential socialization.73 Particularly effec-
tive are the replicative mechanisms that occur through what Bem and
Bem call the “power of an unconscious ideology”:74 well-meaning peo-
ple who consciously subvert gender norms unconsciously enact those
norms in their daily interactions with children and peers; they are
unwitting vehicles for the successful functioning of other components
of the gender system (such as conceptual gender dualism and differ-
ential socialization) that have the historical purpose of producing
gendered individuals.
In sum, both conscious and unconscious design mechanisms
mold infants as reproductions of historical men and women from the
moment they are born. Through these processes an individual comes
to participate in a lineage of men or women and thereby becomes a
member of the historical kind men or women. While biological sex
marks an individual as target for particular ontogenetic processes,
membership in a gender lineage does not require membership in any
particular sexual category. It is possible, and perhaps actual, that
males have been made reproductions of women and females have
been made reproductions of men, provided they underwent the rel-
evant ontogenetic processes. For example, David Reimer—a biologi-
cal male socialized as a woman—might be construed as a woman on
this analysis.75
71. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Frank J. Provenzano, and Zella Luria, “The Eye of the
Beholder: Parents’ Views on Sex of Newborns,” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 44
(1974): 512–19.
72. Linda L. Carli and Danuta Bukatko, “Gender, Communication, and Social
Influence: A Developmental Perspective,” in Eckes and Trautner, The Developmental
Social Psychology of Gender (2004), 295–323.
73. Fagot et al., “Theories of Gender Socialization.”
74. Sandra Bem and Daryl Bem, “Homogenizing the American Woman: The
Power of an Unconscious Ideology,” in Feminist Frameworks: Alternative Theoretical Ac-
counts of the Relation between Men and Women, ed. Alison Jaggar and Paula Rothenberg
Struhl (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978), 10–22. See also Iris Marion Young, Justice and
the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
75. For a description of Reimer’s case, see John Colapinto, “The True Story of
John/Joan,” Rolling Stone, December 11, 1997, 54–97. In order to analyze a case like
this it is important to (a) separate gender from gender identity, and (b) recognize
that gender boundaries might be vague. Concerning this second point, it is relevant
that while gender socialization begins at birth, Reimer’s sexual reassignment surgery
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But here is where the importance of the historical approach
comes into focus. For an individual to be a woman is not for her to
exemplify the four properties that constitute women’s historical gen-
der role—to be subordinated, tender-minded, present her body ac-
cording to the norms of the fashion-beauty complex, and perform
more housework. To be a woman, rather, is to be a reproduction of
a historical lineage, in which case one is only supposed to exemplify
the features of the historical gender role. If a particular female has
undergone the ontogenetic process through which one exemplifies a
participatory relation to a lineage of women, then even if she fails to
exemplify any of the properties of women’s historical gender role,
she is still a woman because she has the right history. The converse
of this point is that an individual who exemplifies all of the properties
of women’s historical role but who does not descend from women is
not, in fact, a woman. This is true of “swamp-woman,” a gender variant
on the familiar thought experiment. If a lightning storm were to strike
a swamp and create a being that perfectly exemplified the properties
that define women’s historical gender role, swamp-woman would not
be a member of the historical kind woman because swamp-woman
does not have the correct history.
E. Historical Gender Kinds and Teleofunctional Gender Kinds
It is important to distinguish between token replicating gender sys-
tems and types of replicating gender systems. Token replicating gen-
der systems are individuated historically, much like the biological taxa
that are studied in the cladistic school of phylogenetic systematics.
Cladists maintain that Homo sapiens from the present and the late
Pleistocene period are members of the same species because they
participate in the same unfractured lineage. Cladists also group traits
as homologues on the basis of common descent. For example, “hu-
man limbs are homologous with avian limbs because both are derived
from the same distant, ancestral tetrapod body plan.”76 The historical
approach to gender applies the same taxonomic method. The US
gender system of the 1950s and the US gender system as it exists today
are members of the same historical kind because the current system
is a descendent of the historical system. Contemporary American
women and American women from the 1950s are members of the
same historical kind because they descend from the same ancestral
population of American women. It is a virtue of cladistic classification
in biology that it reconciles species unity with the fact of evolutionary
did not take place until Reimer was 22 months old. I discuss vague boundaries and
transgendered individuals in Sec. VI.B.3). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing
out the relevance of Reimer’s case to the proposed analysis.
76. Griffiths, Emotions, 213–14.
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change, and it is a virtue of the historical kind approach to gender
that it can provide a principled account of the unity of women and
the unity of men that is consistent with the fact of social change.
On the other hand, there is no significant historical unity be-
tween the American gender system and the Japanese gender system.
American women and Japanese women do not descend from the same
ancestral population of women and are therefore not members of the
same historical gender kind. Yet, the Japanese gender system and the
American gender system exemplify roughly the same structure of in-
terdependencies. That is, the systems are the same type of replicating
gender system, exhibiting patriarchal distribution of status and
power,77 similar division of labor,78 and similar gender stereotypes.79
In the biological domain, phylogenetic systematists describe this type
of phenomenon in terms of analogous (or homoplastic) traits. Anal-
ogous traits resemble one another as a result of parallel evolution
rather than descent from a common ancestor. For instance, distinct
evolutionary lineages have produced organisms with four-chamber
hearts, and while human hearts are homologous to chimpanzee
hearts, they are only analogous to eagle hearts. The reason that the
functional organizations of human and eagle hearts resemble one an-
other is that they share a common type of history. An important
shared feature of eagle hearts and human hearts is their teleological
function: they have in common the property of being supposed to
pump separate streams of oxygen-rich and oxygen-depleted blood.
This point helps indicate the type of cross-cultural unity that ex-
ists for historically defined gender kinds. American and Japanese
women are not members of numerically the same historical kind.
However, the historical gender roles in each system are analogous.
On account of their shared type of history, then, American and Jap-
anese women are members of numerically the same teleofunctional
gender kind. This means that both American and Japanese women
can fail to satisfy their teleofunctional gender norm and yet both are
still members in the cross-cultural teleofunctional gender kind (and,
of course, they are still also members in their respective historical
kinds). Similarly, a nonfunctioning human heart and a nonfunction-
ing eagle heart are both still members of the teleofunctional kind
four-chambered heart.
77. Rhoodie, Discrimination against Women: A Global Survey.
78. Ibid.
79. John E. Williams, and Deborah L. Best, Measuring Sex Stereotypes: A Multina-
tional Study (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990).
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VI. ADJUDICATION BETWEEN HISTORICAL ESSENTIALISM,
SOCIAL OBJECTIVISM, AND THE HPC ACCOUNT
In this section, I compare historical essentialism to social objectivism
and the HPC account with respect to the solutions they offer to the
Commonality and Representation Problems. Because social objectiv-
ism is developed specifically as a theory of gender, it will receive ex-
tended comparison.
A. Comparison between Historical Essentialism and the HPC Account
Historical essentialism and the HPC account both model social kinds
as explanatory, natural kinds, reference to which accommodates ex-
planatory practices in the social sciences. By incorporating social
kinds within the same broad ontological framework as species, elec-
trons, and hurricanes, both accounts provide a similar and non–ad
hoc solution to the Representation Problem.80
On the other hand, historical essentialism is better equipped
than the HPC view to address the Commonality Problems. This fol-
lows from a difference in how the accounts understand the role of
history in determining kind membership. The HPC view requires kind
members to approximate an appropriate degree of (nonhistorical)
feature similarity. Boyd is clear about this when he submits: “Even
when the relevant homeostatic mechanisms crucially involve copying
or information transfer—as is the case of biological species—I do not
for better or worse, hold that HPC kinds are defined by reference to
historical relations among members, rather than by reference to
shared properties.”81 Because HPC kinds are defined by both homeo-
static mechanism(s) and shared properties, exemplification of histor-
ical properties (assuming these are the kind’s homeostatic mecha-
nism) is not sufficient for kind membership. The result, as Ereshefsky
notes, is that “HPC’s emphasis on similarity is at odds with phyloge-
netic approaches to taxonomy. HPC kinds are fundamentally similar-
ity classes, whereas taxa are fundamentally genealogical entities.”82 In
contrast, historical essentialism does not grant a defining role to su-
perficial, nonhistorical properties—reproduction from a historical
80. Family-resemblance property cluster accounts (e.g., Stoljar, “Concept of a
Woman”) do not share this empirical commitment (see Ron Mallon, “Human Cate-
gories beyond Non-essentialism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 15 [2007]: 146–68) for
a comparison between HPC and family-resemblance property clusters). For this rea-
son, they offer a less satisfactory response to the Representation Problem.
81. Richard Boyd, “Kinds, Complexity, and Multiple Realization: Comments on
Millikan’s ‘Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences,’” Philosophical Studies 95 (1999):
67–98, 80.
82. Marc Ereshefsky, “Foundational Issues Concerning Taxa and Taxon Names,”
Systematic Biology 56 (2007): 295–301, 296.
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lineage is sufficient for kind membershp. While reproductive prop-
erties tend to make kind members alike—and this is why historical
kinds support induction and qualify as explanatory natural kinds—a
historical kind’s essence consists in historical properties rather than
characteristic properties. Ereshefsky summarizes that, “for Boyd, sim-
ilarity trumps historical connectedness.”83 We can summarize Milli-
kan’s position, and more generally that of the historical essentialist,
by claiming that historical connectedness trumps similarity.84
With respect to the Commonality Problem of universal gender
properties, HPC’s commitment to shared properties would require
individual women and men to exemplify some subset of the gender
role property cluster. No single gender feature is necessary, yet some
unspecified percentage of the delimited gender role properties is nec-
essary. In contrast, historical essentialism theorizes these features as
probabilistic outcomes of gender reproduction but does not univer-
sally require any percentage of these features for membership in a
gender lineage. Boyd’s commitment to the importance of shared
properties also restricts the extent to which a kind’s defining prop-
erties can change. If there is not significant overlap between a kind’s
characteristic properties at times 1 and 2, then historical properties
rather than characteristic properties secure kind unity—a possibility
that Boyd explicitly denies.85 Applied to gender, this view sets a limit
on the extent to which traditional gender roles can change while men
and women retain kind identity. As I elaborate in Section VI.B.3, his-
torical essentialism allows that men and women persist despite radical
changes in gender role. Finally, the HPC view does not resolve the
normativity problem. The defining property cluster establishes a nor-
mative ideal that can potentially marginalize those who do not ex-
emplify enough of the cluster while privileging those who exemplify
83. Ibid., 296.
84. Mallon’s HPC social role account (see Mallon, “Social Construction, Social
Roles, and Stability”) mentions Millikan’s historical view but does not incorporate any
of the explanatory resources of Millikan’s view. Nor does Mallon distinguish Boyd’s view
from Millikan’s historical commitments. In several places Mallon endorses HPC’s dual
emphasis on property cluster and homeostatic mechanism, which suggests a commit-
ment to the importance of shared nonhistorical properties.
85. See Boyd, “Kinds, Complexity, and Multiple Realization,” 82. Boyd allows this
in the case of “natural individuals,” adding that historical relations are “explanatorily
central” for individuals but not kinds (see Boyd, “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher
Taxa,” 166). Boyd also claims (in apparent tension with his emphasis on property sim-
ilarity in “Realism and Anti-Foundationalism”) that the choice between labeling some-
thing a kind versus an individual is “merely pragmatic” (see “Homeostasis, Species, and
Higher Taxa,” 163) because both accommodate inferential practices.
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the most—or the most “causally basic”86—properties of the cluster. In
contrast, by identifying womanhood with historical properties, histor-
ical essentialism does not provide a standard of occurrent behavior
or social positioning that individuals must approximate in order to
achieve authentic status as a woman.
It is important to recall that while both Boyd and Mallon refer-
ence gender neither provide a HPC account of gender.87 On the other
hand, social objectivism is formulated specifically as a theory of gen-
der. Below I compare Haslanger’s social objectivist theory of gender
with historical essentialism and further describe the historical essen-
tialist answers to the Commonality and Representation Problems.
B. Comparison between Historical Essentialism and Haslanger’s
Social Objectivism
1. Inseparability.—The inseparability problem results from what
Spellman calls “pop-bead metaphysics”—the mistaken view that gen-
der is a discrete component of an individual that gets added, like a
bead on a string, to other discrete components such as race and class.
The mistake is to think that social properties like race and gender
have a simple, additive relationship rather than a more relationally
complex, perhaps emergent, relationship. Haslanger addresses this
problem by providing an abstract definition of women. The central
concept of subordination is described generally enough so that it can
take on a variety of forms as a result of further social variables. But
the generality of the definition cuts in the other direction as well, for
it does not provide any specific way to think about the relationship
between gender and other social properties.
In contrast, the historical kind approach provides a theoretical
framework for thinking about intersectionality. In addition to gender
systems, there are, presumably, a range of other systems that define
historical social roles, such as “California migrant worker” and
“Oprah’s book club member.” One approach to intersectionality is to
study the actual historical relationships between replicating systems.
A second direction of research may involve examining the compati-
bility between different social, teleological norms. If individuals par-
ticipate in many social lineages that resulted from selective processes,
then they each acquire an assortment of teleological norms. The
historical kind approach provides criteria for individuating these
norms—a first step in the study of their interaction. A third method
86. Robert A. Wilson, Matthew J. Barker, and Ingo Brigandt, “When Traditional
Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds,” Philosophical Topics 35 (2007): 189–215.
87. The absence of such an account also leaves the inseparability problem unre-
solved. Without an analysis of gender, we cannot evaluate the relationship between
gender and other social kinds.
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is to examine nesting relationships that obtain between historical sys-
tems. Nested within the American gender system is the gender system
at a university, and nested within the university gender system is the
gender system of a fraternity. Empirical focus on the replicative re-
lationships between nested systems, as well as the compatibility be-
tween their teleological norms, may reveal interesting facts about in-
tersectionality.
2. Universality.—Individuals who are not subordinated on the basis
of observed or imagined sex do not count as women on Haslanger’s
view. Mikkola questions whether this definition excludes the Queen
of England.88 On the historical account, the only individuals who are
not members of the kind women are those who have not undergone
the ontogenetic processes through which one exemplifies a partici-
patory relation to the historical gender role, and therefore other
women. This means that women need not actually perform any aspect
of their historical gender role. The queen is a woman if she has the
right ontogeny, in which case she is supposed to be subordinated, but
it is not essential to her womanhood that she actually is subordinated.
As discussed in Section V, women who do not participate in the
same token gender system are not members of numerically the same
historical gender kind. However, given the logical relationship be-
tween historical kind membership and possession of a teleological
function, individuals with analogous historical gender roles are mem-
bers of the same teleofunctional gender kind. If a token historical
gender system were to have binary (or unary or ternary) gender roles
that are not analogous to those of men and women, then individuals
who occupy these roles would not be men or women. This is, I submit,
a good result. Such individuals share neither history nor assigned so-
cial role, and so it is not clear what property, besides physiology, would
justify their inclusion in the kinds men and women.
As discussed in Section V.D, the historical account excludes
swamp-woman from the category women. If swamp-woman exhibits the
surface indicators of womanhood, then others who are conditioned
in a historical gender system are apt to systematically mistake “her”
as a woman and treat her as if she were a woman (although if such
treatment is prolonged it could eventually convert swamp-woman into
a historical woman; see Sec. VI.B.3). While swamp-woman deserves
moral consideration, her case does not undercut the historical basis
of the political category women. In addition to recognizing morally
relevant properties that swamp-woman shares with others (e.g., being
conscious and self-aware), we can distinguish between what we can
88. Mari Mikkola, “Gender Concepts and Intuitions,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy
39 (2009): 559–83, 565.
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call “natural kind political representation” and “ad hoc political rep-
resentation.” The former advocates on behalf of categories for which
members tend to share certain social and political properties (such
as oppressions and opportunities) for the same reason. The latter ad-
vocates for individuals who accidentally share similarities with natural
political kinds. While human flourishing and justice require both forms
of representation, the need for ad hoc political representation should
not serve as a corrective to natural kind political representation. To
illustrate, suppose that a lightning storm strikes a bog and creates an
individual who has the exact beliefs, desires, phenomenology, emo-
tions, and memories as an actual holocaust survivor. “Swamp–holocaust
survivor” (like swamp-woman) likely deserves some form of ad hoc po-
litical representation. Yet, I think most would agree that the existence
of swamp–holocaust survivor should not cause us to change either the
historical basis of the category holocaust survivor or the need for po-
litical advocacy specifically on behalf of holocaust survivors. Further-
more, I think most would agree that natural kind political representa-
tion has high practical importance because it locates natural social
kinds with systematic, rather than accidental, sources of oppression. If
a bizarre series of ecological and biochemical changes were to cause
swamps everywhere to systematically produce swamp-women, then
swamp-women would receive natural kind political representation as
swamp-women. Otherwise, swamp-woman is represented ad hoc—not
“as” a woman but “as if ” a woman.89
3. Immutability.—Suppose that a patriarchal gender system under-
went a gradual process of social change in which the gender role of
women evolved to feature traditional masculine properties and social
privilege and the gender role of men evolved to feature traditional
feminine properties and social subordination. On Haslanger’s view, it
would seem to follow that females are now men and males are now
women. Or suppose that the current gender system evolved into an
egalitarian gender system. According to Haslanger’s social objectiv-
ism, if individuals were neither subordinated nor privileged on the
basis of sex, then “men” and “women” would be eliminated (though
perhaps distinct gender groups would take their place).90
These unintuitive results do not follow on the historical account
of gender. So long as there are unfractured lineages that connect
89. Even if certain historical women (e.g., the Queen of England) or historical
holocaust survivors fail to manifest properties that others might perceive as morally
urgent (lack of opportunities, trauma, unpaid restitution, etc.), I contend that it is
nonetheless important that they are morally and politically recognized as women and
as holocaust survivors rather than recognized and represented ad hoc.
90. See Haslanger, “Gender and Race,” 49–50.
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gender role occupants, then men and women retain their kind iden-
tity despite changes in the characteristic properties of their gender
roles. Such lineages would also retain status as explanatory kinds in
two respects. First, theoretical categories often accommodate scien-
tific explanatory practices because they are inclusive of continuous
historical stages and regardless of property dissimilarity between
stages. After periods of substantial social change, it is likely that the
historically defined categories men and women will continue to support
social scientific explanatory practices, analogous to the way that cat-
egories for viruses, genes, meteorological events, and homologous traits con-
tinue to accommodate scientific explanatory practices across periods
of property change.91 Second, changes to the characteristic properties
of a gender role occur through a uniform and gradual process.92 At
a particular time, then, it is still the case that kind members share
likenesses which are grounded by historical processes. Now, if there
were no longer a system of social interdependencies organized
around bodily dimorphism, then historical gender roles, as well as
men and women, would be eliminated. But given the social impor-
tance attributed to human reproduction and sexual difference, this
is empirically unlikely.93 The compatibility between the historical ac-
count of gender and social change has important political implica-
tions. On the view that gender is a natural kind with a historical es-
sence, it is possible for women of the present to pursue political
causes that have the goal of eradicating oppression for women of the
future. This is not possible on Haslanger’s model of social objectivism.
A distinct form of mutability involves the changing gender status
of a single individual. As Stone points out, Haslanger’s view suggests
that women who challenge their subordination are at the same time
challenging their womanhood.94 Certainly the view implies that a
woman who enters a position in which she is no longer subordinated
thereby exits the category of women. Historical essentialism does not
have this result. One’s status as a woman is secured through events
that occurred primarily before the age of ten. Thus gendered indi-
91. For example, Hull remarks: “Genes can belong to the same lineage even though
they are structurally different from other genes in that lineage. What is more, continued
changes in structure can take place indefinitely” (David Hull, “A Matter of Individuality,”
Philosophy of Science 45 [1978]: 335–60, 340).
92. Oriel Sullivan, Changing Gender Relations, Changing Families: Tracing the Pace of
Change over Time (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
93. Alcoff, “Visible Identities”; Marilyn Frye, “The Necessity of Differences: Con-
structing a Positive Category of Women,” Signs 21 (1996): 991–1010.
94. Alison Stone, An Introduction to Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2007).
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viduals can change in myriad ways while not affecting the relational
property that is constitutive of their membership in a gender kind.
Because one’s status as a man or woman is conditional upon his-
torical relata, individuals cannot simply stipulate their gender status
as “woman” or “man.” Indeed, individuals do not have privileged ac-
cess to historical processes, and it follows that they can be mistaken
about their own gender status (it is less likely that they are mistaken
about their gender identity).95 Yet we should not infer from this that
individuals have no control over their gender status. It may be arbi-
trary to restrict the ontogenetic processes that confer gender status
to specific periods of development. If so, then individuals can be
made reproductions of women or men in middle adulthood, say, as well
as early childhood. It may be reasonable to interpret some transgen-
der and transsexual individuals as initiating those ontogenetic pro-
cesses that transform individuals into reproductions of whichever gen-
der lineage they were not originally assigned. If a gender system
directs its replicative machinery toward individuals on the basis of
their appearance as male/man or female/woman, then one would
need to present the right appearance in order to trigger the repro-
ductive processes that confer membership to the desired gender lin-
eage.
But at what point does an individual successfully transition into
a new gender? During transition, is one a member of both genders
at the same time? These are difficult questions, and they do not have
clear answers. The empirical processes that ground kind membership
for historical kinds are often uneven and “catch up some members
more squarely than others.”96 In these cases, the resulting historical
kind will have vague boundaries. Compare this to eternal kinds, which
tend to have sharp boundaries due to steady grounding principles
such as microstructure. Transitions between historical kinds are also
vague. As distinct ontogenetic processes displace older ones, there
may be no precise moment at which an individual transitions from
one gender to another.97 This is not unique to gender but rather
generalizes to other historical kinds. For example, if a coffeehouse
chain recycles its paper cups directly into paper napkins, there may
be no precise moment at which the paper pulp transitions from one
95. Analogously, semantic externalists claim that the contents of many terms and
concepts are determined by causal and/or historical relations between thinkers and
world—relations which thinkers can be mistaken about (see, e.g., Hillary Putnam, “The
Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 [1975]: 215–71;
Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, and Clear and Confused).
96. Millikan, Clear and Confused, 25.
97. I will leave open the possibility that an individual can participate simultaneously
in multiple gender lineages and possess multiple gender teleological functions.
This content downloaded from 129.001.011.117 on May 20, 2018 18:52:23 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
270 Ethics January 2012
artifact kind to another. Recognition of vague transitions and vague
borders results from the commitment to empirical, as opposed to con-
ceptual, standards for classification.
4. Normativity.—The normativity problem is twofold. First, it states
that any proposed definition of gender will entail that these experi-
ences rather than those experiences are what count toward inclusion
in a gender kind, thereby marginalizing individuals with experiences
in the latter category. Haslanger, recall, treats this issue by falling back
on the ameliorative aspect of her project. She concedes that her def-
inition may marginalize nonsubordinated females, but relative to the
general aims of feminist theory, “they are not the ones who matter.”98
The second version of the normativity problem is that any definition
of gender will end up having a normative effect. The specific concern
for an account like Haslanger’s is that individuals who strive to actu-
alize their womanhood are striving for subordination. While Has-
langer states that “[her] definition is more likely to offer a negative
ideal that challenges male dominance,” we are not given any reasons
to hold this claim true.99
The historical essentialist response just given to the universality
and immutability problems indicates a solution to the normativity
problem. The historical view of gender is more inclusive than rival
accounts of gender, and as a result it will marginalize fewer individ-
uals. Marginalized individuals would be those who were not socialized
as men or women. But these ontogenetic processes are ubiquitous—
certainly more so than any of the properties described in the content
of historical gender roles (properties that secure gender membership
on other accounts). Nor does the historical account have trouble with
the second normativity problem. Because it is one’s ontogenetic his-
tory rather than one’s psychology or social position that confers gen-
der status, there are no current behaviors or social positions that one
ought to pursue in order to actualize gender status.
5. The Representation Problem.—Nominalists about gender address
the Commonality Problems by avoiding them: concerns about univer-
sality and normativity do not arise if there are no membership con-
ditions for the kinds men and women. This tactic creates the Represen-
tation Problem: denying the existence of women as a group undercuts
women’s advocacy. The primary appeal of social objectivism is its ca-
pacity to theorize women as a real, mind-independent group while
not invoking the strong universalism implicit in traditional ontologies
of gender. The resource that enables this balancing act is the onto-
logical notion of an objective type.
98. Haslanger, “Gender and Race,” 46.
99. Ibid.
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An objective type is a mind-independent similarity class. As noted
in Section III, this ontological classification is rather nondiscriminat-
ing. Objective types include “items on a desk,” “items outside the
moon’s orbit,” and “all the atoms that are not presently in the Queen
of England’s left thumb nail.” In addition to being nondiscriminatory,
objective types are nonexplanatory: claiming that a group of items is
an objective type is to state a unity rather than explain a unity. In
contrast, an ontology of historical kinds provides explanations for ob-
jective similarities. The present proposal agrees with Haslanger’s so-
cial objectivism that women generally share the objective similarity of
social subordination. But rather than making this property definitive
of women, it explains this property as one of several properties that
reliably co-occur as a result of a more fundamental, historical prop-
erty.
VII. CONCLUSION
According to historical essentialism, men form a natural kind and
women form a natural kind. The essential property of women, in vir-
tue of which an individual is a member of the kind “women,” is par-
ticipation in a lineage of women. In order to exemplify this relational
property, an individual must be a reproduction of ancestral women,
in which case she must have undergone the ontogenetic processes
through which a historical gender system replicates women. As a re-
sult of her ontogenetic history, and also the phylogenetic history of
women’s gender role, a woman acquires a teleological gender func-
tion. Women from historically isolated cultures are members of the
same teleofunctional gender kind and have the same teleofunctional
gender norms if their historical gender roles are structurally analo-
gous, that is, if they share the same type of ontogenetic history and
their gender systems share the same type of phylogenetic history.
Most current accounts of gender ascribe weak ontological unities
to gender kinds in order to avoid a set of problems associated with
commonality, normativity, and political representation. These ac-
counts mistake characteristic, objective similarities as definitive prop-
erties of a gender kind. While the resulting theories of gender may
blunt the force of the above problems, they fail to eradicate them.
The current essay has argued for the ironic conclusion that the Com-
monality and Representation Problems are best solved by offering a
stronger ontological characterization—one that explains objective
similarities in reference to an essential, historical property. I argued
that replicative processes that take place during an individual’s on-
togenetic history cause an individual to participate in a historical gen-
der lineage and that this replicative process explains why gendered
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individuals tend to share certain behavioral, psychological, and social
properties. But by locating the essence of gender kinds in wider his-
torical processes, the account allows for individuals who fail to ex-
emplify characteristic gender properties to retain their gender status
nonetheless. The account also provides strong grounds for a future,
egalitarian gender system as compatible with the current, historically
defined genders men and women. Finally, because these ontological
claims are consistent with the classificatory practices employed in the
natural and social sciences, they should not be reproached as post
hoc solutions to the problem of political representation for gender
categories.
This content downloaded from 129.001.011.117 on May 20, 2018 18:52:23 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
